|
Smithsonian Digital Repository >
National Museum of Natural History >
Department of Vertebrate Zoology >
Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
http://hdl.handle.net/10088/221
|
| Title: | Failed Refutations: Further Comments on Parsimony and Likelihood Methods and Their Relationship to Popper’s Degree of Corroboration |
| Authors: | de Queiroz, Kevin Poe, Steven |
| Keywords: | Assumptions corroboration Karl Popper likelihood parsimony philosophy phylogenetics probability |
| Issue Date: | 2003 |
| Publisher: | Society of Systematic Biologists |
| Citation: | Syst. Biol. 52(3):352–367 |
| Abstract: | Kluge’s (2001, Syst. Biol. 50:322–330) continued arguments that phylogenetic methods based on the statistical
principle of likelihood are incompatible with the philosophy of science described by Karl Popper are based on false premises
related to Kluge’s misrepresentations of Popper’s philosophy. Contrary to Kluge’s conjectures, likelihood methods are
not inherently verificationist; they do not treat every instance of a hypothesis as confirmation of that hypothesis. The
historical nature of phylogeny does not preclude phylogenetic hypotheses from being evaluated using the probability
of evidence. The low absolute probabilities of hypotheses are irrelevant to the correct interpretation of Popper’s concept
termed degree of corroboration, which is defined entirely in terms of relative probabilities. Popper did not advocate minimizing
background knowledge; in any case, the background knowledge of both parsimony and likelihood methods consists of the
general assumption of descent with modification and additional assumptions that are deterministic, concerning which
tree is considered most highly corroborated. Although parsimony methods do not assume (in the sense of entailing) that
homoplasy is rare, they do assume (in the sense of requiring to obtain a correct phylogenetic inference) certain things about
patterns of homoplasy. Both parsimony and likelihood methods assume (in the sense of implying by the manner in which
they operate) various things about evolutionary processes, although violation of those assumptions does not always cause
the methods to yield incorrect phylogenetic inferences. Test severity is increased by sampling additional relevant characters
rather than by character reanalysis, although either interpretation is compatible with the use of phylogenetic likelihood
methods. Neither parsimony nor likelihood methods assess test severity (critical evidence) when used to identify a most
highly corroborated tree(s) based on a single method or model and a single body of data; however, both classes of methods
can be used to perform severe tests. The assumption of descent with modification is insufficient background knowledge
to justify cladistic parsimony as a method for assessing degree of corroboration. Invoking equivalency between parsimony
methods and likelihood models that assume no common mechanism emphasizes the necessity of additional assumptions, at
least some of which are probabilistic in nature. Incongruent characters do not qualify as falsifiers of phylogenetic hypotheses
except under extremely unrealistic evolutionary models; therefore, justifications of parsimony methods as falsificationist
based on the idea that they minimize the ad hoc dismissal of falsifiers are questionable. Probabilistic concepts such as degree
of corroboration and likelihood provide a more appropriate framework for understanding how phylogenetics conforms
with Popper’s philosophy of science. Likelihood ratio tests do not assume what is at issue but instead are methods for
testing hypotheses according to an accepted standard of statistical significance and for incorporating considerations about
test severity. These tests are fundamentally similar to Popper’s degree of corroboration in being based on the relationship
between the probability of the evidence e in the presence versus absence of the hypothesis h, i.e., between p(e|hb) and
p(e|b), where b is the background knowledge. Both parsimony and likelihood methods are inductive in that their inferences
(particular trees) contain more information than (and therefore do not follow necessarily from) the observations upon
which they are based; however, both are deductive in that their conclusions (tree lengths and likelihoods) follow necessarily
from their premises (particular trees, observed character state distributions, and evolutionary models). For these and other
reasons, phylogenetic likelihood methods are highly compatible with Karl Popper’s philosophy of science and offer several
advantages over parsimony methods in this context. |
| URI: | http://hdl.handle.net/10088/221 |
| Appears in Collections: | Department of Vertebrate Zoology
|
Items in DSpace are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.
|